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ABSTRACT
Globalization has fundamentally accelerated and altered business transactions.
The search for low labor costs and cheap raw materials has led to a proliferation of
international transactions, and large, international law firms are called on to partici-
pate in complex transactions helping business tap into sources offinance around the
world for investment. This article first examines the theoretical underpinnings of inter-
national legal practice, taking into account the historiography of U.S. and U.K. law
firms. Part II describes the economic and political factors behind law firms' rise. Part
III analyzes the success of the common law, as expressed through contract, at the ex-
pense of civilian codes. Part IV examines how international law firms have capitalized
on their growth and success. Part V draws upon Luhmann's sociology of law to begin
to explain how law firms achieve their aims by creating supporting and enabling struc-
tures for business. Part VI highlights a case study of the creation of a legal investment
device, the U.K. Pfandbriefe. The conclusion suggests some ways of bringing these di-
verse strands together that explain law firms' roles in international business transac-
tions through the management of uncertainty and stabilization of expectations.
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JOHN FLOOD
INTRODUCTION: THE CONTEXT AND LEGAL CERTAINTY
Globalization has fundamentally accelerated and altered business transac-
tions. The search for low labor costs and cheap raw materials has led to a prolif-
eration of international transactions.' While the economics of these transactions
have adapted to the demands of globalization with, for example, the use of com-
plex derivatives' structures to hedge against various contingencies, the legal as-
pects remain deeply embedded within domestic laws rather than international
law. Gessner, Appelbaum, and Felstiner have articulated four discourses "about
the way businesses are supported and structured in the global environment."
These form a continuum from universalistic to particularistic solutions:
[Olne emphasises the importance of formal legal rules, a second
emphasises autonomous rules in the form of business self-regula-
tion (lex mercatoria), a third focuses on the decisive role of the legal
profession itself in structuring business relationships and in bridg-
ing the gap between legal cultures, and a fourth emphasising the
importance of tightly-knit, informal business networks, as exem-
plified in the guanxi relationships of Chinese business culture.2
The purpose of this article is based on the third discourse, the role of the legal
profession in business transactions. In particular, the focus is on the role of the large,
international law firms.3 This broadly means attention here is fixed on the law firms
of London and New York. The kinds of transactions that international law firms
are called on to participate in are large, diverse, complex, and usually done under
punitive time constraints. A key area of work for international law firms, for ex-
ample, is capital markets, that is helping business tap into sources of finance around
the world for investment. The two main sources are the London and New York
markets and there is intense competition between them. An illustration of the kind
1. See generally The World Bank Group, Assessing Globalization: What is Globalization?, (April
2000), http://wwwl.worldbank.org/economicpolicy/globalization/agOl.html (discussing the ris-
ing amount of economic activity taking place between entities in different countries).
2. Volkmar Gessner, Richard P. Appelbaum & William L.F. Felstiner, Introduction to RULES
AND NETWORKS: THE LEGAL CULTURE OF GLOBAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 1, 8 (Richard P. Appel-
baum, William L.F. Felstiner & Volkmar Gessner eds., 2001) [hereinafter RULES AND NET-
WORKS].
3. See also John Flood, Megalawyering in the Global Order: The Cultural, Social and Economic
Transformation of Global Legal Practice, 3 INT'L J. LEGAL PROF. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 169, 170-71 (1996).
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of work undertaken will demonstrate the complexity and range of tasks. The island
of Sakhalin on the eastern coast of Russia has extensive oil and gas reserves. It con-
stitutes Russia's first offshore oil and gas project with an estimated cost of at least $9
billion.' Because of the environmental impact of the project, the Russian Production
Sharing Agreement Law5 required certain local laws to be in place during the proj-
ect. As only 70 percent of the necessary legislation was in place,6 the work of draft-
ing the legislation was outsourced to one of the large law firms that provided the
final draft of the legislation. The project involved expertise in environmental regu-
lation, tax law, banking and financing, and regulatory issues-an extensive remit.
The massive scale of these projects creates massive scope for uncertainty.
Through the creation of "typified solutions," that is, elaborate documentation, law-
yers can bring a kind of legal certainty to the transaction. But it is a contingent cer-
tainty, one that is capable of being overturned for a number of reasons: "Social
exchanges across borders are based on lower, more specific expectation structures
like social roles. . . or simply on personal relationships. '7 Despite its contingent na-
ture, there are benefits to this kind of certainty because it is formed in the embedded
networks that come into play as the transaction progresses.' As there is a relatively
small number of players in the field, business flows to them with minimal or no
costs of advertising.9 Reputation is easily ascertained and maintained providing sta-
ble market shares for the participants. Leifer reinforces this view when he says: "A
4. See Sakhalin-1 Project, http://www.sakhalinl.com/index.asp (last visited Nov. 13, 2006);
Sakhalin Energy: The New Energy Source for the Asia-Pacific, Sakhalin-2 Project, Meeting the
Energy Challenge, http://www.sakhalinenergy.com/en/ataglance.asp?p=aagmain&s=l (last
visited Nov. 13,2006). According to Shell, which at one time owned 55% of Sakhalin-2, the project
is costing "$100 a second and occupying 60m person-hours a year." Thomas Catan, Remote Re-
source: Shell's Sakhalin Task Shows an Industry Its Daunting Future, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 9,
2006, at 15, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/574fa34a-80b4-1 lda-8f9d-0000779e2340.html.
5. Law of the Russian Federation on Production Sharing Agreements, Art. 7(2), Sobr. Zako-
nod. RF, 1995, No. 225-FZ, available at LEXIS, Rflaw File, GARANT 10005771.
6. John Flood, Capital Markets: Those Who Can and Cannot Do the Purest Global Law Markets,
in RULES AND NETWORKS, supra note 2, at 249, 257.
7. Gessner, Appelbaum & Felstiner, supra note 2, at 10.
8. See generally Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Em-
beddedness, 91 AM. J. Soc. 481 (1985) (discussing the extent to which, in modern industrial society,
economic action is embedded in structures of social relations); Brian Uzzi, The Sources and Conse-
quences of Embeddedness for the Economic Performance of Organizations: The Network Effect, 61
AM. Soc. REV. 674 (1996) (explaining how embeddedness offers unique opportunities and that
firms organized in networks have a better chance of surviving than those firms that maintain
arm's length market relationships).
9. Joel M. Podolny, A Status-Based Model of Market Competition, 98 AM. J. Soc. 829, 838
(1993).
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small and identifiable group of producers, attached to brands,... hold onto stable
market (volume) shares. The reputations are not arbitrarily distributed across pro-
ducers, but are often tied to market share."1 This is the case with large law firms.
This article first examines the theoretical underpinnings of international
legal practice, taking into account the historiography of U.S. and U.K. law firms.
Part II describes the economic and political factors behind law firms' rise. Part III
analyzes the success of the common law, as expressed through contract, at the
expense of civilian codes. Part IV examines how international law firms have
capitalized on their growth and success. Part V draws upon Luhmann's sociology
of law to begin to explain how law firms achieve their aims by creating supporting
and enabling structures for business. Part VI highlights a case study of the cre-
ation of a legal investment device, the U.K. Pfandbriefe. Finally, in the Conclu-
sions I suggest some ways of bringing these diverse strands together that explain
law firms' roles in international business transactions through the management of
uncertainty and stabilization of expectations.
I. THE THEORY AND HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PRACTICE
The rise of the international law firm seems unconquerable. One reason is
that state and supranational lawmaking have not been able to stay abreast with
the rapid developments in the globalization of law. The only institution that has
marched in step has been the large international law firm. No global transac-
tion-contract, distribution agreement, securitization, franchise-can be engi-
neered without them. They have colonized the world of global law.
While the large law firm is a secular institution and globalization follows
non-theocratic routes, large law firms nevertheless possess a sacred role. It is they
who sanctify the relationships that global actors form when they engage in busi-
ness. Without the imprimatur granted in the documentation of the large law
firm, business dealings will always appear somewhat profane and suspect. Sacred
institutions are generally formed with traditional authority and power vested at
the top among a small number of individuals. The world of global business and
law is none too different. Although law is depicted as a rational enterprise based
on impersonal characteristics, the role of the international large law firm in this
sphere is enshrined as a Weberian form of traditional authority." Authority, in
10. Eric M. Leifer, Marketsas Mechanisms: Using a Role Structure, 64 Soc. FORCES 442, 442-43 (1985).
11. See MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF AN INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOCY 215-
16 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Bedminster Press 1968) (1956).
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this form, calls for legitimation that arises from the institutional legacy of habitu-
alization and typification, which locates the institution of the large law firm in the
sub-universe of law. Berger and Luckmann portray legitimation thus:
Legitimation "explains" the institutional order by ascribing cognitive
validity to its objectivated meanings. Legitimation justifies the insti-
tutional order by giving a normative dignity to its practical impera-
tives. It is important to understand that legitimation has a cognitive
as well as a normative element. In other words, legitimation is not
just a matter of "values." It always implies "knowledge" as well. 2
Legitimation may be distinguished at various levels, of which the highest are
the symbolic universes, which "are bodies of theoretical tradition that integrate
different provinces of meaning and encompass the institutional order in a sym-
bolic totality . '. ."" Since the symbolic universe is the "matrix of all socially objec-
tivated and subjectively real meanings,"'4 the role of the large law firm is engaged
as part of the normality of the symbolic universe. Although within the totality of
meanings the large law firm is marginal-there are relatively few firms and the
character of work is esoteric-"the symbolic universe provides the ultimate legiti-
mation of the institutional order by bestowing upon it the primacy in the hierar-
chy of human experience."'5 There is in place a double legitimation: the first refers
to the legitimation process carried out by large law firms themselves within the
context of international business transactions, and the second is the legitimation
conferred upon the large law firm itself within the symbolic universe. Through
the division of labor, large law firms have come to embody the traditional author-
ity of the expert, an authority that is superior to most practitioners in the field.
In many ways international law firms resemble the Society of Jesus, the Jesu-
its. The formation of the Jesuits by Ignatius Loyola was constructed by careful
testing of rules and customs, refusing to codify them until they had proven their
worth over time and in different circumstances. 6 One of their key aims was to
proselytize overseas, which they did by establishing missions in the Americas and
12. PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY: A TREA-
TISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 86 (1966).
13. Id. at 88.
14. Id. at 89.
15. Id. at 91.
16. J. H. Pollen, The Society of Jesus, in NEW ADVENT CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA (2006),
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/14081a.htm.
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the Far East. They were convinced of the need to apply technical expertise on the
church's behalf and thus set up many colleges and universities to train young men.
Moreover, the order initiated its members as novitiates who spent many years
studying before being selected as members of the "professed," the most senior
order. Even the quotation attributed to St. Francis Xavier, co-founder of the Jesu-
its (1506-1532), "Give me the children until they are seven and anyone may have
them afterwards,"'7 or as it is sometimes quoted, "...and I will give you the
man,"'" is redolent of Cravath's training method for associates. 9 The Jesuits also
adhered to ritual based on Ignatian spirituality requiring devotion, meditation,
and a zeal for saving the souls of others. 21 Yet all this was to be done with a sense
of detachment from immediate desires and interests.
The following example illustrates the role of law firms as a Jesuitical sanctifier,
one that seeks the "salvation" of the participants' "souls." A $2 billion 50/50 joint
venture between Nissan, of Japan, and Dongfeng Motor, of the People's Republic of
China (PRC), was proposed. 21 The key to the joint venture was the complete re-
structuring of the entire Chinese state-owned enterprise, not merely its subsidiar-
ies. 22 Crucial to the joint venture was a $1 billion investment by Nissan into the new
company, the largest foreign investment into the Chinese motor industry.23 Dong-
feng's counsel on both the restructuring and the joint venture was Jones Day Reavis
& Pogue, a large U.S. law firm headquartered in Cleveland, Ohio, which used law-
yers for this transaction from its Shanghai, Taipei, Tokyo, Los Angeles, and Cleve-
land offices. 24 Even though PRC and Japanese law firms participated in the deal,
only a law firm with the kudos and international stature of Jones Day could prove to
the international financial community that such an arrangement was worthwhile,
above board, and, more importantly, worth repeating. Jones Day, by virtue of its
participation, was able to verify the bonafides of the transaction. Even if the transac-
tion had been conducted fairly and competently by local, mainland PRC law firms,
the level of belief would have been unacceptably low or nonexistent.
17. SEVEN UP (Granada Television 1964).
18. Wikipedia.org, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seven-Up (last visited Jan. 11, 2007).
19. See 2 ROBERT T. SWAINE, THE CRAVATH FIRM AND ITS PREDECESSORS 1819-1849: THE CRAVATH
FIRM SINCE 1906, at 4-5 (1948).
20. Pollen, supra note 16.
21. Press Release, Jones Day, Jones Day Counsels on Landmark Automobile Joint Venture in





To summarize, the large international law firm is a pillar of globalization-
globalization cannot succeed without the large law firm. How then did the large
law firm come to occupy such a position? From whence did it come? My focus
will primarily be on the law firms of the United States and the United Kingdom.
That is not to say there are no large law firms elsewhere in the world, but rather
that the Anglo-American law firm axis is the biggest and most important, and it
possesses the most used body of law in international transactions.
A. Law Firms in the United States
According to de Tocqueville, lawyers have always enjoyed a relatively elevated
status in the United States compared to France or the United Kingdom." For the
United States, it was the industrial revolution and the spread of the railroads that
spurred the growth in numbers of law firms and their sizes.26 Despite the United
States developing later than the United Kingdom, the large law firm emerged
first in the United States rather than the United Kingdom. The year 1870 not only
marked a surge in commerce and business in the United States but also the rise of
the new American law school when Christopher Columbus Langdell became
dean of Harvard Law School. Langdell borrowed the pedagogical techniques of
the chemistry laboratory to create the case method of teaching law,27 which en-
abled law students to be finely graded and, with the best students becoming the
editors of the law review, law firms were able to select the most qualified graduat-
ing students as their new associates. Law firm recruitment could move away from
socially-based ascription toward merit-based selection. While Langdell provided
the model for the new law school, Cravath, a New York attorney, was devising
improvements to, and creating the organization of, the new corporate law firm.28
He became the Ignatius Loyola of legal practice. All of these moves were part of
the idea that law was a science.29
25. See 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 326-28 (Henry Reeve trans.,
Schocken Books 1961) (1835).
26. Robert W. Gordon, The American Legal Profession, 1870-2000, in CAMBRIDCE HISTORY OF
LAW IN AMERICA (Christopher Tomlins & Michael Grossberg eds., forthcoming 2007) (manuscript
at 20-21, on file with author).
27. See ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850s TO THE
1980s 52-53 (1987).
28. See generally SWAINE, supra note 19, at 1-12 (explaining the key features of the "Cravath
Firm" and the "Cravath System").
29. Gordon, supra note 26, at 15.
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Typically, new lawyers worked as associates for their employers' clients as well
as for their own. This division of labor created a concomitant division of loyalties
between firm and client. Moreover, there was no guarantee that an associate would
be made a partner within the firm. Cravath altered that unsatisfactory state of af-
fairs by refining the "up or out" method of law firm management. An associate
would be hired on probation for several years and would work only on matters for
the firm's clients. At the end of a successful probation, the associate could expect to
become a partner. If he did not make partner, the firm would attempt to place
him in the office of one of its clients.3" The system maintained associates' motiva-
tion and loyalty to the firm and simultaneously removed disaffected associates and
cemented good and enduring relations with the firms' clients. According to
Galanter and Palay, this mode of law firm organization set law firms on a steady
course of exponential growth.31 Law firm histories show New York law firms
growing rapidly.32 Sullivan & Cromwell, for example, had over 200 lawyers by the
1930s, causing Karl Llewellyn to caution about law factories mopping up all the
best lawyers, leaving too few to do the remaining "law jobs" in society.33
During this period large law firms ceased to be shifting constellations of indi-
viduals-although individuals could exert enormous influence, as, for example,
John Foster Dulles in Sullivan & Cromwell and, later, at the State Department"-
and became recognizable institutions with clear brand names. The firm itself be-
came the crucial and also publicly visible entity.
B. Law Firms in the United Kingdom
Despite entering the Industrial Revolution earlier than the United States, and
even enjoying global aspirations through the British Empire, the practice of law
in the United Kingdom remained a cottage industry. The term "law factory" did
not gather salience until the post-World War I period. Nevertheless, corporate
30. See id. at 42.
31. MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION
OF THE Bic LAW FIRM 99-108 (1991).
32. See generally John Flood, Resurgent Professionalism? Partnership and Professionalism in Global
Law Firms, in REDIRECTIONS IN THE STUDY OF EXPERT LABOUR (S. Ackroyd, G.D. Muzio & J.F.
Chanlet eds., forthcoming 2007) (discussing the development of specific New York firms).
33. K. N. Llewellyn, The Bar Specializes-With What Results?, 167 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
Soc. Sc. 177, 177-79 (1933).
34. See generally NANCY LISAGOR & FRANK Lipsius, A LAW UNTO ITSELF: THE UNTOLD STORY OF
THE LAW FIRM SULLIVAN & CROMWELL 99-118 (1988) (discussing the rise and fall of John Foster
Dulles in his career at the law firm of Sullivan & Cromwell).
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law firms developed, some with grand and important lineages and connections
such as Freshfields, lawyers to the Bank of England."
The United Kingdom also came late to modern legal education but it never
developed along U.S. lines of the Socratic dialogue, preferring the traditional
unidirectional lecture model.16 English law did not have the "scientific" preten-
sions of U.S. law. Recruitment, as befitted the English class system, followed as-
criptive selection based on family linkages. 7 Unlike U.S. law firms, English
solicitors and barristers did not pay salaries to their young lawyers; conversely,
they required premiums from them for the privilege of working in the practice.
The expansion of English law firms was capped by various companies' acts lim-
iting partnership numbers to no more than twenty partners until 1969. Even
though English firms had flat profiles like their U.S. cousins, the Cravath-type
process never occurred because of the arbitrary limits and lack of merit-based
selection. English law firms therefore remained small in comparison to the U.S.
firms until the lifting of the partnership cap and the growth in legal and com-
mercial work in the 1970s."
C. The Move Toward Flexible Partnership
Partnership was traditionally considered a marriage for life with little thought
of divorce. This typification is exemplified in Emmanuel Lazega's study of a New
England corporate law firm, which followed the classic partnership model. 9 Part-
ners were remunerated by lockstep and the possibility of defections was managed
by the judicious allocation of resources, mostly associates, to partners. Partners
embraced feelings of autonomy and yet participated in the collective by virtue of a
set of interdependent resource networks, which meant they had to collaborate in
order to do their work. In the last twenty years of the 20th century, law firms have
rethought their organizational forms. Size has brought management and bureau-
cracy, both usually anathema to lawyers, and undermined the traditional profes-
35. JUDY SLINN, A HISTORY OF FRESHFIELDS 159 (1984).
36. WILLIAM TWINING, BLACKSTONE'S TOWER: THE ENGLISH LAW SCHOOL 79 (1994).
37. See, e.g., SLINN,SUpra note 35, at 53-70 (discussing how eight members of the Freshfield fam-
ily, spanning four generations, became partners in the firm).
38. Flood,supra note 3, at 178-79.
39. See generally EMMANUEL LAZEGA, THE COLLEGIAL PHENOMENON: THE SOCIAL MECHANISMS
OF COOPERATION AMONG PEERS IN A CORPORATE LAW PARTNERSHIP (2001) (using a corporate law
partnership as an example of a specific collegial organization in which partners lock themselves
into a long-term situation).
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sional partnership but not completely negated it. In its place a new organizational
archetype emerged, namely, the managed professional business (MPB).40 Man-
agement has also brought in its train measurement, scaling, ranking, and targets.
MPBs celebrate this through the use of "eat what you kill" types of remunera-
tion.4' MPBs also engage in rational strategic market behaviors with high levels of
intra-firm specialization. Partners are required to fulfill goals along with their
associates. Goal-setting for partners has been further emphasized by the increase
in the rate of introduction of two-tier and multi-tier partnerships, thereby ex-
tending probation periods. 42 Failure to achieve specified targets has meant the
easing out, or de-equitization, of partners. 43 Of course, if partners can be eased
out, then they can also leave. Individual lawyers and even teams of lawyers began
to move from firm to firm, taking their clients with them, sometimes following
the lure of more money, other times in search of new markets and greater auton-
omy. Partnerships have become shifting constellations of lawyers with a dimin-
ishing sense of loyalty to the firm.4" To compound the centrifugal force, law firm
mergers with their inevitable disjunctions of cultures have become de rigueur.
The modern large law firm has thus truly become a business, a law factory, in a
highly competitive market.
D. From Strong to Weak Ties
The move toward MPBs has been accompanied by a fundamental shift in
the structure of lawyer-client relationships. The core of large law firm practice
was a stable of repeat, durable clients who fed their entire range of legal work to
their firm. Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy is a classic case in point: the firm
40. C. R. Hinings, Royston Greenwood & David Cooper, The Dynamics of Change in Large Ac-
counting Firms, in RESTRUCTURING THE PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATION: ACCOUNTING, HEALTH CARE
AND LAW 131, 152 (David M. Brock, Michael J. Powell & C.R. Hinings eds., 1999).
41. See generally MILTON C. REGAN, JR., EAT WHAT You KILL: THE FALL OF A WALL STREET
LAWYER 15-49 (2006) (discussing the transition from the "nobody starves" mentality to "eat what
you kill").
42. See generally William D. Henderson, An Empirical Study of Single-Tier Versus Two-Tier Part-
nerships in the Am Law 200, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1691 (2006) (discussing the advantages and disadvan-
tages of single-tier versus two-tier partnerships).
43. See Leonard Bierman & Rafael Gely, So, You Want To Be a Partner at Sidley & Austin?, 40
Hous. L. REV. 969,989 (2003).
44. See, e.g., LINCOLN CAPLAN, SKADDEN: POWER, MONEY, AND THE RISE OF A LEGAL EMPIRE 63-
71 (1993); KIM ISAAC EISLER, SHARK TANK: GREED, POLITICS AND THE COLLAPSE OF FINLEY KUM-
BLE, ONE OF AMERICA'S LARGEST LAW FIRMS 209 (1990).
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handled all the Rockefeller family's business as well as the banking work of
their bank, Chase National. 45 During the 1970s the ties began to weaken be-
tween law firms and their clients." Two reasons suffice here: the first is that law
firms themselves were weaker organizations with far more lawyer movement
and lateral hiring, reducing firm loyalties; the second is that corporations took
more of their legal work in-house and expanded their legal departments. Law
firms were hired not so much for their history with their clients but rather their
competence in particular transactions. The rise of Skadden and Wachtell Lip-
ton are examples of law firms that targeted specific kinds of work, e.g., hostile
takeovers, and concentrated on transactions at the expense of forming long-term
client relationships. 7 These shifts to transactional work have had repercussions
throughout the legal profession and legal work: beauty parades have become
part of the normal currency of obtaining work, law firms have to take account
of diversity,4" and have to consider the role of corporate social responsibility in
their legal advice. 9
II. ENGINES OF GLOBAL LEGAL GROWTH
In many respects the Cold War was a golden era for international law firms.
The West was out to ensure the world adhered to ideas of liberal democracy and
free market economics-the Washington consensus-and not be seduced by ir-
rational notions of socialist state-centered economic planning.50 States assisted
business in promoting its interests overseas and lawyers drafted the documenta-
45. KAI BIRD, THE CHAIRMAN: JOHN J. MCCLOY, THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN ESTABLISH-
MENT 273-74 (1992).
46. John P. Heinz, Robert L. Nelson & Edward 0. Laumann, The Scale of Justice: Observations
on the Transformation of Urban Law Practice, 27 ANN. REV. Soc. 337, 346-49 (2001).
47. See CAPLAN,supra note 44, at 202-27; William H. Starbuck, Keeping a Butterfly and an Ele-
phant in a House of Cards: The Elements of Exceptional Success, 30 J. MGMT. STUD. (SPECIAL ISSUE)
885, 885 (1993).
48. David B. Wilkins, Why Global Law Firms Should Care about Diversity: Five Lessons From the
American Experience, 2 EUR. J.L. REFORM 415, 417-19 (2000).
49. See generally HALINA WARD, INT'L INST. FOR ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE BUSINESS OF LAW (2005), availableat http://www.iied.org/SM/CR/docu-
ments/Corporateresponsibilityandthebusinessoflaw.pdf (reporting on the implications of the cor-
porate responsibility agenda for the practice of business law); Halina Ward, The Interface Between
Globalisation, Corporate Responsibility, and the Legal Profession, I U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 813 (2004)
(discussing the importance of integrating legal ethics and corporate social responsibility).
50. See generally MARTIN WOLF, WHY GLOBALIZATION WORKS 36-39 (2004) (discussing how the
acceptance of liberal democracy has been common to all advanced market economies).
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tion that guaranteed its success. Moreover, lawyers were implicated in the process
all the way through. John Foster Dulles of Sullivan & Cromwell was U.S. Secre-
tary of State;5 his brother, Allan, was director of the Central Intelligence Agency;52
John J. McCloy of Milbank Tweed was Allied High Commissioner for Germany
and lead the German Marshall Plan;53 and George Ball of Cleary Gottlieb was
conferring with Jean Monnet on the European Economic Community 4 and help-
ing establish Cleary offices in Paris in 1949" and in Brussels in 1960.6 More were
in the wings.
The main impetus for growth in global legal work came from the rapid de-
velopment of financial and capital markets. 7 Through the 1960s the Eurodollar
and Eurobond markets were establishing themselves and requiring massive
amounts of legal documentation. By the 1970s, with the extreme rent-seeking
behavior of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the
world's banking system became shaky and bankruptcy and restructuring work
became more prevalent in the United States and United Kingdom. It was, how-
ever, the opening up of the capital markets especially in the global cities of New
York, London, and Tokyo, 8 that helped the "Big Bang" deregulation of London's
financial markets. Banks moved from lending directly and adopted the role of
broker and adviser, i.e., disintermediation, assisting business in taking many of its
liabilities off the balance sheet through techniques like securitization."s U.S. banks
found that by opening offices in London they could avoid the strictures of the
Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 that restricted their domestic activities. The 1980s were
51. LISAGOR & LiPsius, supra note 34, at 165.
52. Id. at 203.
53. THOMAS ALAN SCHWARTZ, AMERICA'S GERMANY: JOHN J. MCCLOY AND THE FEDERAL REPUB-
LIC OF GERMANY 40-42 (1991).
54. JAMES A. BILL, GEORGE BALL: BEHIND THE SCENES IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 109 (1997).
55. Id. at 102.
56. Cleary Gottleib, About the Firm, Firm History, http://www.cgsh.com/english/about/about.
aspx?id= 000320919205 (last visited Nov. 13, 2006).
57. See generally DAVID HELD, ANTHONY MCGREw, DAVID GOLDBLATT & JONATHON PERRATON,
GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS: POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND CULTURE 218, 234-35 (1999) (discussing the
exponential growth in global finance).
58. SASKIA SASSEN, THE GLOBAL CITY: NEW YORK, LONDON, TOKYO 171-72 (2d ed. 2001); see also
Posting of Bill Henderson, Global Cities and Law Firms, to Empirical Legal Studies, http://www.
elsblog.org/the-empirical-legal-studi/2006/07/global-cities-a.html (July 13, 2006, 06:47 EST)
(naming New York the top U.S. "global city" as a hub for international commerce).
59. See John Flood, Capital Markets, Globalisation and Global Elites, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL
PROCESSES: GLOBALISATION AND POWER DISPARITIES 114, 117 (Michael Likosky ed., 2002) [hereinaf-
ter TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES].
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a ferment of financial activity as derivatives markets multiplied their products
and employed the power of leverage.6 This growth has continued to the present
day.
III. EXPLAINING THE SUCCESS OF COMMON LAW
All these activities needed creative lawyering to facilitate their progress and
deal with the regulatory obstacles that were put in their way. The type of law
practice that could facilitate business had to be expert, well-connected with the
regulatory authorities, and know how to invoke disputing practices as well as ne-
gotiating skills. 6'
The sociologist Max Weber argued that the best form of lawmaking for mod-
ern capitalism would be formally rational, that is, internally coherent without having
to appeal to any phenomena or noumena external to the system.62 Formal rationality
was, for Weber, idealized within the civilian system of lawmaking, but the advance
of capitalism was not located within the countries that subscribed to civil codes.63
Instead, real progress was found within systems of substantive rationality, which,
although coherent, would invoke appeals to external forces such as policy or custom.
The result of the openness of the substantively rational systems was that they pos-
sessed a malleability unfound in the civilian systems. Given the speed at which fi-
nancial markets were pushing, lawmaking had to respond with similar alacrity.
Embodied within this concept of lawmaking was a particular style of lawyer-
ing and reproduction of lawyers. The civilian codes were bound up with niceties
and distinctions of the academic lawyers constantly seeking to polish and refine
their internally coherent systems. This push toward consistency was made at the
expense of rapid response to situations as they occurred in real time. It is not sur-
prising therefore that the academies took the prime role in producing the future
generations of lawyers, imbuing them with a reverence for the sanctity of the code
above all else.
60. See Flood, supra note 3, at 186; Flood, supra note 6, at 253-58.
61. According to Marc Galanter and Joel Rogers, from the University of Wisconsin Law School,
business added the strategies of litigation and disputing to its armory without expecting their de-
ployment to interfere with the course of normal business relations. Making love and war were no
longer mutually exclusive. See generally Marc Galanter & Joel Rogers, The Transformation ofAmer-
ican Business Disputing? Some Preliminary Observations (Inst. for Legal Studies, Disputes Process-
ing Research Program, Working Paper No. 10-3, 1991).
62. See WEBER, supra note 11, at 641-43.
63. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, MAX WEBER 118-46 (1983).
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Weber clearly observed the paramountcy of the English bar in responding to
commercial exigencies. The common law system was piecemeal, ad hoc, with no
desire to be polished to some pristine state. It was content to be rough, as were its
practitioners, who although they did not entirely scorn the academy, frequently
took degrees in subjects other than law. Their training in law came through ap-
prenticeship, learning on the job. Law was a craft skill-a form of "cautelary ju-
risprudence"-not a theoretical pursuit for philosophers. As Weber put it:
Not only was systematic and comprehensive treatment of the whole
body of the law prevented by the craftlike specialization of the law-
yers, but legal practice did not aim at all at a rational system but
rather at a practically useful scheme of contracts and actions, oriented
towards the interests of clients in typically recurrent situations. 4
Anglo-American jurisprudence was unfettered and not beholden to law as
an idealistic form.
The advantage of common law was that freedom of contract meant freedom
to construct contracts as freestanding documents not tied to the ambitions of a
code prowling in the background. Typical continental contracts are only a few
pages in length, whereas the usual English or American contract will run to hun-
dreds or thousands of pages or more with schedules. Nothing is left to external
confirmation: if it is not in the contract it does not exist.65 Contract creates a sys-
tem of private ordering that invokes the state symbolically but obscures it in re-
gard to actual conduct.6 6 Here, contract means the privatization of law. And here
lies the advantage of the Anglo-American system and its practitioners and the
reason they have been successful in the international arena.
Since contract allows for virtually any normative system to constitute its base,
choice of law is made for instrumental purposes rather than concerns of jurisdic-
tional fidelity. Furthermore, if financial services are one of the key engines of glo-
balization, then the number of salient jurisdictions with appropriate rules and
norms are relatively few. In fact, there are for all practical purposes only two: Eng-
lish law and New York state law." They are represented by the city principalities of
64. WEBER, supra note 11, at 787.
65. 1 have observed an ancillary explanatory document attached to a large securitization that ran for
50 pages defining the terms of the contract. The first term was 'day,' which was defined as 24 hours.
66. See Mark C. Suchman, The Contract as Social Artifact, 37 LAW & Soc'v REV. 91, 91 (2003).
67. Flood, supra note 59, at 115.
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London and New York. The cities are emblematic of their states' legal, financial,
and cultural power and authority.6 Most transnational agreements will at some
stage be transcribed into one or both of these systems. Thus, New York and London
law firms possess distinct advantages over firms from other jurisdictions. Moreover,
these law firms will actively market their jurisdictions-it's what they know best-
and they are keen to maintain their competitive advantage. For example, in its reply
to the British government's 1989 Green Paper on the work and organization of the
legal profession, the City of London Law Society wrote: "The advantages of Eng-
lish law as a 'product' enable solicitors to contribute to this country's balance of pay-
ments some £25,000,000 per annum in invisible exports and constitute an important
part of the attraction of the City of London as a world financial centre.' 9
Despite the internal benefits and strengths of Anglo-American law to inter-
national transactions, there are other reasons for its dominance. One explanation
can be found in the concept of path dependence. It creates particular disincentives
to market entry for others because there are substantial transaction costs involved
in the attempt. The examples of the QWERTY typewriter keyboard and VHS
video tapes confirm how sets of early and continuing adopters can create histori-
cal lock-ins that are difficult to change, i.e., "increasing returns to adoption."7 °
IV. THE RISE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW FIRM
The first point to make is that there are relatively few of these large law firms
within the general population of law firms. They are, however, big: the largest of
them have over 3000 lawyers located in offices throughout the world. Nevertheless,
they are small in comparison to the major accounting firms. For example, Pricewater-
houseCoopers has "a combined headcount" of more than 140,000 professionals work-
ing in 771 offices in 149 countries.7' In contrast, Clifford Chance has 3,200 lawyers72 in
29 offices in 20 countries, 3 and Baker & McKenzie has 3,400 attorneys in 70 offices in
68. See Sassen,supra note 58, at 4.
69. CITY OF LONDON LAW Soc'v, THE WORK AND ORGANIZATION OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION: A
RESPONSE TO THE GOVERNMENT'S GREEN PAPER 5 (1989).
70. W. Brian Arthur, Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In By Historical
Events, 99 EcON. J. 116, 116 (1989).
71. PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2006 Global Annual Review, http://www.pwc.com (follow "Our
Global Annual Review" hyperlink; then follow "Facts and Figures" hyperlink; then follow "Peo-
ple" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 15, 2006).
72. 2005 UK 100 Annual Report, Top 100 Profile, Clifford Chance, http://www.thelawyer.com/
uklOO/2005/law/l_cliffordchance.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2006).
73. Clifford Chance, About the Firm, http://www.cliffordchance.com/about-us/aboutthe_
firm (last visited Nov. 15, 2006).
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38 countries.74 One effect of the enormous growth in law firms has been the intensi-
fication of specialization within them and also between offices in the same firm.
Each department or section inside a firm has become a firm within a firm, or rather
the firm becomes a set of networks." Besides the competition between firms for cli-
ents and work, competition also exists within firms where departments are in con-
stant battle with each other for resources and remuneration. This is exemplified by
Lazega's analysis of the internal Montesquieu structures within firms that operate to
prevent fission.7 6 The general move to "eat what you kill" remuneration, however, has
militated against some of these preventative measures and served to intensify compe-
tition between lawyers, creating a far more fluid market for lawyers between firms.
77
"The Global 100" law firm survey produced by The Lawyer and American
Lawyer shows that only eight of the listed top fifty firms are based in the United
Kingdom. The remainder are headquartered in the United States.78 Although the
U.K. firms are in a minority, they have a strong presence as illustrated by their gross
revenue figures. Of the top nine firms grossing over $1 billion, four are London
firms-Clifford Chance, Linklaters, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, and Allen &
Overy.7" These billion dollar club law firms are evenly spread among New York,
London, and Chicago.s°
74. Baker & McKenzie, Firm Profile, Key Facts & Figures, http://www.bakernet.com/Baker-
Net/Firm+Profile/Key+Facts+Figures/default.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2006).
75. GERARD HANLON, LAWYERS, THE STATE AND THE MARKET: PROFESSIONALISM REVISITED 129-
30 (MacMillan Press LTD 1999).
76. See generally LAZECA, supra note 39, at 182-200 (arguing that the Montesquieu structure
keeps a balance of power between different niches in collegial organizations).
77. See REGAN, SUpra note 41, at 34.
78. See 2005 UK 100 Annual Report, Global 100, Top 100: 1-25, http://www.thelawyer.com/
globall00/2006/tb_l-25.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2006) [hereinafter Global 100: 1-25]; 2005 UK
100 Annual Report, Global 100, Top 100: 26-50, http://www.thelawyer.com/globallOO/2006/tb-
26-50.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2006) [hereinafter Global 100: 26-50].
79. See The Lawyer Global 100 2005, http://www.thelawyer.com/globall00/2005 (follow "Top
100: 1-25" hyperlink and "Top 100: 26-50" hyperlink to view the top 50 firms) (last visited Sept. 24,
2006). However, it has been reported that Clifford Chance has become the first law firm to achieve
a turnover of more than £1 billion, mostly on the back of national and multinational mergers and
acquisitions and business advising on 444 deals globally, valued at a total of $490 billion (E260 bil-
lion). Robert Verkaik, City Law Firm Clifford Chance is World's First £Jbn Legal Business, THE IN-
DEPENDENT (London), Aug. 25, 2006, at 18.
80. See Henderson,supra note 58 (discussing the expansion of law firms in the global cities). For
a chart illustrating the connections between capital and law practice, showing in which cities the
majority of Fortune Global 500 companies are headquartered, see Fortune Global 500 2006, Top
Cities, (July 24, 2006), http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2006/cities/. The key
law firms in the major cities are known as the 'Charmed Circle' in New York, which includes
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The disparity in U.K. and U.S. law firms is further highlighted in the profits
per partner figures. Nearly all eight law firms in "The Global 100" with profits per
equity partner (PEP) of more than £1 million ($1.9 million) are based in the United
States with an emphasis on New York. At the top is Wachtell Lipton with a PEP
exceeding £2 million ($3,790,000). Only a single U.K. firm, Slaughter and May,
breaks the £1 million PEP barrier at £1.05 million ($1.9 million). If the revenue per
lawyer (RPL) statistics are examined, which, according to Bruce MacEwen, "[it's a
lot harder to game total revenue and number of lawyers than it is to game profit-
ability. This strikes me as a pretty hard number, all things considered,""1 then the
certainty that the U.S. law firms are making more money than U.K. firms is ines-
capable. Only two U.K. firms within the top fifty global law firms muster an RPL
of £400,000 and above.12 Consider further two firms of comparable stature and size:
Slaughter and May (London) with 575 lawyers and 121 partners; and Cravath
Swaine & Moore with 389 lawyers and 79 partners. 3 Both firms have eschewed
growth by spawning very few overseas offices, relying on loose affiliations with local
firms elsewhere. Cravath generates PEP of £1.2 million compared to Slaughter's
£1.05 million.8 4 The revenues per partner are £3.14 million for Cravath and £2.2
million for Slaughter and May.85 And, finally, the RPL for Cravath is £638,000 com-
pared to £504,000 for Slaughter.86 On the surface the two firms do more or less the
same types of work, employ similar types of lawyers, and have the same kinds of
clients, but there is a significant difference between the two that explains to some
extent why U.S. law firms may succeed in areas where U.K. firms do not.
Since the U.S. legal profession has no artificial divisions of labor like the Brit-
ish profession, U.S. lawyers are expected to offer a full-range service that inevita-
bly includes litigation expertise. A firm like Cravath, for example, handles
full-scale capital markets work in tandem with defending the New York Times in
court in high-profile First Amendment cases. English law firms typically out-
seven firms, and the 'Magic Circle' in London with five firms. International Firms: Tryingto Get the
Right Balance, THE ECONOMIST (London), Feb. 28, 2004, at 65 [hereinafter International Firms].
81. Adam Smith, Esq., The 2006 AmLaw 100: Ranked by Revenue Per Lawyer, http://www.
bmacewen.com/blog/archives/2006/04/the_2006_amlaw_100_ranked.html (Apr. 29,2006, 10:27 EST).
82. See The Lawyer Global 100 2005, 1-25 Full Table, http://www.thelawyer.com/
globallOO/2005/topl-25.pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2007) [hereinafter 1-25 Full Table]; The Lawyer
Global 100 2005, 26-50 Full Table, http://www.thelawyer.com/globallOO/2005/top26-50.pdf (last
visited Jan. 11, 2007) [hereinafter 26-50 Full Table].





source the court/advocacy parts of their litigation work to the Bar," and are only
beginning to acquire the capacity to take cases into court without using barristers,
but that is still exceptional."5 Furthermore, when English law firms have set up in
cities like New York, their inexperience in litigation and their difficulty in attract-
ing good U.S. litigators have held them back.
The distinction between the two legal cultures is important because of my ear-
lier reference to the way business is now conducting its relationships. Engaging in
disputes no longer necessarily means either, in Macaulay's terms, ignoring the con-
tract and thrashing it executive to executive without the intervention of lawyers, or
going to court and breaking the business relationship. 9 Business is more likely to
adopt the full range of techniques, legal and extra-legal, including litigation, arbi-
tration, alternative dispute resolution, and negotiation, without anyone sounding
the death knell to the business relationship. The upshot is that clients expect their
law firm to provide them with a full menu of legal services. U.S. law firms are struc-
tured to provide this range; U.K. firms are lacking key areas. While it may seem
that litigation expertise is only of use within domestic jurisdictions and therefore of
little value to the global lawyer, the converse is actually true. Litigation expertise is
called for in arbitration as well as in other non-state forms of dispute settlement.
Dezalay and Garth have indicated that U.S. law firms have succeeded in breaking
the stranglehold of the old European notables in international arbitration by offer-
ing a formalized, U.S. style approach-technocratic as opposed to aristocratic-one
that is less dependent on personality and culture and more on rules.9 °
U.S. law firms are, at bottom, supported by a large domestic law market.9 '
Going global for them is dependent on the sustained development of their origi-
87. John Flood, Barristers, in 1 LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD: A POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND CUL-
TURAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 130, 131 (Herbert M. Kritzer ed., 2002).
88. Andy Boon & John Flood, Trials of Strength: The Reconfiguration of Litigation as a Contested
Terrain, 33 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 595, 595-96 (1999).
89. See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM.
Soc. REV. 55, 60-62 (1963).
90. See YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 302 (1996). But see Fa-
bian Sosa, Different Strategies of Mega and Midsized Law Firms to International Lawyering: The
Example of International Commercial Arbitration 11 (2006) (working paper, on file with U. of Bre-
men Collaborative Research Center 597) (critiquing the Dezalay and Garth study). For a short
history on international courts of arbitration and a description of new challenges they face, see
Robert Briner, Globalization and the Future of Courts of Arbitration, 2 EUR. J.L. REFORM 439
(2000).
91. See Carole Silver, Globalization and the U.S. Market in Legal Services-Shifting Identities, 31
LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1093, 1099-1100 (2000).
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nal markets. The success of firms like Cravath and Wachtell Lipton exemplifies
the policy of primarily concentrating on their home markets and using networks
of overseas law firms to build their international practices." U.K. firms have never
really possessed the luxury of a big domestic market and therefore have always
had to seek work outside the United Kingdom.9 The empire provided conduits
into profitable regions such as the Middle East and Asia. The globe has reconfig-
ured itself with major regions becoming established, such as the European Union,
North American Free Trade Agreement, and possibly the Association of South
Eastern Asian Nations. The big three regions represent the bulk of inward and
outward foreign direct investment flows in the world.94 Moreover, they have estab-
lished their own disputing regimes, with even organizations such as the World
Trade Organization developing their own jurisprudence through dispute panels.
An advantage enjoyed by U.S. firms is their long ties with investment bank
clients.9 The major investment banks that engage in the capital market deals are
all from the United States, e.g., Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and Merrill
Lynch. We know from law firm histories that these ties go back more than 100
years. And strangely, though the lawyer-client relationship has undergone some-
thing of a change in recent years, from one-stop shop to transactional relations,
some of these particular ties have endured.
While some firms have been able to rely on such traditional ties, the changes
in the business landscape brought about by mergers and acquisitions, restructur-
ings, and so forth, have made lawyer-client relations more tentative. In house
counsel are stricter in regard to legal budgets, often asking law firms to commit to
beauty parades to obtain work. Law firms have to market themselves and enlist
the aid of the state in opening legal markets for them.96
92. See International Firms, supra note 80, at 67.
93. John Morris, one of the founders of Ashursts, a City of London corporate law firm, was, in
the late 19 h century, "'a director of 13 successful public enterprises' who had 'frequently been
employed ... to start at a few hours' notice, on a voyage across the Atlantic to assist in unravelling
some vast complication in the American railway system."' LAURIE DENNETT, SLAUGHTER AND MAY:
A CENTURY IN THE CITY 23 (1989).
94. See HELD, McGREw, GOLDBLATT & PERRATON,Supra note 57, at 250-51.
95. See Flood, supra note 6, at 254-55.
96. For an example, see Lord Falconer of Thoroton, Constitutional Affairs Secretary and Lord Chan-
cellor, Keynote Address at the KPMG Annual Law Lecture, London: International Opportunities (Jan.
26, 2006) (transcript available at http://www.dca.gov.uk/speeches/2006/spO60126.htm), wherein he
states, "I want to talk this evening about how we retain our position at the leading edge of the interna-
tional trade in legal services. How we encourage exports, by helping lawyers who wish to work in other
countries; and promote imports by encouraging the use of this country as a place to settle disputes.... As
I am sure you are aware, the U.K. Government, through the European Commission, takes part in the
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Acting globally while thinking locally is fine as long as a firm is not con-
strained by local mores. The crucial question is to what extent international law
firms are merely exporting English or New York law as opposed to engaging in
the practice of local law. The U.K. Lord Chancellor has said:
Our common law of contract is now a world-wide commodity. It
has become so because it is a system that people like. In ever more
complex, sophisticated and inter-related markets, English commer-
cial law provides predictability of outcome, legal certainty and fair-
ness. It is clear and is built upon well-founded principles, such as
the ability to require exact performance and the absence of any
general duty of good faith.97
The large law firm's main alliance is with the Anglo-American nexus, which
is composed of, among other things, neo-liberal democracy and respect for prop-
erty rights as exemplified in the Washington Consensus. It therefore has to create
ways to tie in local norms to the overarching pattern devised in English and U.S.
law. Finding ways of dovetailing sometimes incommensurable systems has led to
the globalization of legal education and training. Young lawyers from jurisdic-
tions outside the Anglo-American nexus now find it essential to obtain an LL.M.
degree at a major U.S. or U.K. law school, otherwise they will not be conversant
with global legal techniques. 98 Some reinforcement for this view is found within
intergovernmental organizations such as the World Bank, which usually insist on
their lawyers possessing a master's degree. Yet, as one big law firm partner said,
"It doesn't matter where you got your legal education as basically we do the same
thing over and over. Once you've been trained in the firm you have your skills."' 9
V. CREATING AND PROVIDING SUPPORT STRUCTURES
Luhmann's development of law starts with a world characterized by complex-
ity and contingency. "Complexity in practice means compulsion to select, contin-
General Agreement on Trade in Services-GATS-negotiations within the WTO. The U.K. objective
in these negotiations is to persuade as many countries as possible to make liberalising commitments."
97. Id.
98. See Carole Silver, The Case of the Foreign Lawyer: Internationalizing the U.S. Legal Profession,
25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1039, 1040 (2002). For a discussion on how law schools in the U.S. and
U.K. are responding to the demand for global legal education, see John Flood, Legal Education,
Globalization, and the New Imperialism, in THE LAW SCHOOL-GLOBAL ISSUES, LOCAL QUESTIONS
127, 140-44 (Fiona Cownie ed.,1999).
99. Interview with large law firm corporate lawyer, in London, Eng. (Apr. 2005).
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gency means danger of disappointment and the necessity to take risks."'00 This
existential situation gives rise to eventual stable systems that stabilize expectations in
relation to the environment. The presence of the alter ego, however, introduces un-
certainty yet grants the opportunity to take others' experiences and "expand [one's]
own horizon of experience without loss of time."'' The social world thus creates a
double contingency, because the other is treated as an "I," yet he is able to act inde-
pendently. What becomes important therefore is the certainty in the expectation of
expectations rather than the fulfillment of expectations. Luhmann stipulates two
kinds of expectations, cognitive and normative. Cognitive expectations are medi-
ated by adaptation in the face of disappointment, whereas normative expectations
persist and are not rejected no matter if they are acted against. In Luhmann's terms,
"norms are counterfactually stabilised behavioural expectations. Their meaning im-
plies unconditional validity.... The symbol of the 'ought' expresses primarily the
expectation of such counterfactual validity without putting this quality of expecta-
tion to discussion."'0 2 And finally, law is defined as the "structure of a social system
which depends upon the congruent generalisation of normative behavioural expecta-
tions." 0 3 Some systems are inherently unstable and require management; the market
is a clear example. The structural coupling of the economic and legal systems
through property and contracts enables the normative structures of the legal system
to be available in the economic system.
Moving from the local, national context to the global arena creates vast new
spheres of uncertainty as at this level the normative order is plural and frag-
mented, and likely to remain so. 04 Therefore, in the "supranational context, more
so than in domestic spheres, 'interlegality' and 'internormativity', that is, the rela-
tionships between a diversity of normative orders hold the key to legal certainty."' '
There is scope for the interplay of power and consensus between organizations,
professions, and business communities, which means normative expectations are
integrated at lower levels of abstraction and generality because the role of law is
100. NIKLAS LUHMANN, A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF LAW 25 (Martin Albrow ed., Elizabeth King
& Martin Albrow trans., 1985).
101. Id. at 26.
102. Id. at 33.
103. Id. at 82.
104. See Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime Collisions: The Vain Search for
Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 999, 1000 (2004).
105. Volkmar Gessner et al., A4 Research Team, In the Shadow of the State? Autonomous Struc-
tures in Globalized Exchange Processes 26 (2005) (working paper, on file with U. of Bremen,
Collaborative Research Center 597).
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diminished here. These structural conditions are amenable to the malleability
and pragmatism of Anglo-American jurisprudence. Large law firms by virtue of
their position in society and the economy are able to provide support structures
for their clients, or attempt to manage uncertainty for them. They provide the
legitimation, which has both cognitive and normative elements, about which
Berger and Luckmann speak.' For them, law is essentially one tool among many
to be adopted and brought into play as and when required. Choice of law and
laws, for example, is open and multivalent. International business agreements
often require the coordination of several sets of laws and those which seem the
most adaptable will be selected to act as the coordinators. In many cases, this role
falls to New York state law and English law. 7 Removing the state from the equa-
tion, for instance, by the use of international arbitration, is one method of manag-
ing expectations. Alternatively, parties may select a particular jurisdiction for
disputing purposes, e.g., northern Germany or the Commercial Court in Lon-
don.""0 The point about disputing is that it usually occurs too late in the process to
act as a stabilizing practice that delivers predictability and normalcy. Disputing
often brings about a resolution that might entail the cessation of relations between
the parties. The question then becomes: what is it that large law firms do to stabi-
lize expectations?
There are, however, factors that go beyond the use of some form of law that
induces stability. Lawyers themselves are members of coordinating networks that
interact to bring about stabilization of expectations. In the first instance there are
the law firms that are multinational by virtue of having many overseas offices.
Secondly, there are the law firms that are single-jurisdiction based yet are plugged
into a series of interlocking networks that create a set of "best friends," who pro-
vide extensive reliability and durability. Furthermore, these law firms are net-
worked with a range of professional service firms, including banks, consulting
firms, and accounting firms, among others. The intellectual forces of these firms
endorse a set of actions that are co-extensive and display repeated patterns. In
106. See BERGER & LUCKMANN, supra note 12, at 111.
107. Flood, supra note 6, at 252. For an example of U.S. law supplanting Russian law, see D.
McBarnet, Transnational Transactions: Legal Work, Cross-Border Commerce and Global Regulation,
in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES, supra note 59, at 98, 103-07.
108. See, e.g., Volkmar Gessner, International Cases in German First Instance Courts, in FOREIGN
COURTS: CIVIL LITIGATION IN FOREIGN LEGAL CULTURES 149, 150-58 (Volkmar Gessner ed., 1996);
John Flood, The Cultures of Globalization: Professional Restructuringfor the International Market, in
PROFESSIONAL COMPETITION AND PROFESSIONAL POWER: LAWYERS, ACCOUNTANTS AND THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF MARKETS 139, 150 (Yves Dezalay & David Sugarman eds., 1995).
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Luhmann's terms these are typified solutions that are formulated in legal lan-
guage that is part of a shared lexicon of meaning. 109 There are many examples of
these typified solutions that aim to establish certainty and stabilize expectations.
Two are cited above: Jones Day's involvement with Dongfeng's restructuring and
Freshfield's role in the development of the Sakhalin oil and gas extraction and
refining. These examples illustrate how law firms attempt to establish certainty
within a context of uncertainty and de facto lawlessness. Enabling and support
structures via their typified solutions compensate for the power imbalances im-
manent in the market in its more rebarbative forms.
With these kinds of roles and activities, large law firms, in managing uncer-
tainty and stabilizing expectations, create a set of solutions that function autono-
mously. That is, they do not supplant the state, but rather supplement the state in
providing solutions or support structures that operate in independent contexts by
virtue of consensus and authority granted by the status of the law firm itself. For
example, certain "Magic Circle" law firms in London will refuse to use other firms'
documentation because they consider their own to be of "holy" status not to be sub-
verted by intermingling with heretical structures devised by others. It is the brute
fact that the documentation in a transaction issued from a particular firm that, in
part, enables the transaction to progress. In other situations it may be particular in-
dividuals who are able to sanction arrangements that are riven with uncertainty.
The lawyer appointed as examiner, Richard Gitlin, in the first major cross-border
insolvency, Maxwell, was able to exert tremendous authority by virtue of his long
standing and high esteem within the community that had thought about the prob-
lems of cross-border insolvency. The protocol he developed to manage the incom-
patibilities between American and British insolvency regimes became a template for
other similar cross-jurisdictional infractions."0 Would these kinds of transactions be
possible without the endorsement and cooperation of large law firms? While it is not
possible to give a dispositive answer, the evidence suggests it is unlikely.
VI. CASE STUDY: MIMESIS IN THE COVERED BOND MARKET
In this section of the paper I present a case study drawn from my empirical
work. The case represents the creation of a special type of collateralized bond
109. See LUHMANN,supra note 100, at 25-26.
110. John Flood & Eleni Skordaki, Normative Bricolage: Informal Rule-making by Accountants
and Lawyers in Mega -insolvencies, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 109, 125 (Gunther Teubner
ed., 1997).
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known as "covered bonds." Covered bonds are defined as "securities backed by
mortgages or public sector loans that remain on the issuer's balance sheet,""1 and
"senior debt instrument[s] of the issuer having priority recourse to a pool of assets
ringfenced from the other assets of the issuer, [which are] often regarded as sub-
stitutes for government debt.""' 2
The secondary market in mortgages is huge. In 2004, the European Central
Bank (ECB) reported that the volume of mortgage loans in Europe exceeded 4
trillion and was growing at the rate of 8 percent a year."3 But it is an area in which
there is little European integration, and as the ECB pointed out,
Less than 40% of mortgages are financed via the capital market,
the remainder is deposit financed. The two capital market instru-
ments to fund mortgages-covered bonds and residential mort-
gage backed securities (RMBS)-are heterogeneous across
countries because of differences in legal, tax and regulatory frame-
works governing issuance in the respective jurisdictions. Those
cross-country differences have prevented a geographic diversifica-
tion to take place. So far mortgage loan portfolios that underlie
covered bond issuance or are backing RMBS transactions have
been purely domestic."4
In some European countries, such as Germany, France, and Ireland, legislation
exists to issue covered bonds, but not in the United Kingdom. In Germany, the
mortgage-backed bond is called the Pfandbriefe (under the German Mortgage Bank
Act of 1900). In this situation the bank issues bonds which are secured on a ring-
fenced pool of mortgage-backed assets. The legislation protects them in the event of
the bank's insolvency so that the bondholders are ahead of other creditors. The
bonds have a low-risk rating and the assets have to match the outstanding claims
111. ABN-AMRO, Glossary, The Definitive Guide to Investment Banking, http://www.gradu-
ate.abnamro.com/glossary.do (last visited Nov. 15, 2006).
112. ARJAN VERBEEK, BARCLAYS CAPITAL, UNDERSTANDING UK COVERED BONDS: DEVELOPMENT
AND FUTURE GROWTH (2005), http://www.cml.org.uk/cml/filegrab/Funding-ArianVerbeek.
pdf?ref= 4451.
113. Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank,
Speech at the European Mortgage Federation Annual Conference: Capital Markets and Financial




and indeed should exceed the assets to provide a cushion. The bank is obligated to
top up the assets as and when required. These bonds are particularly useful for
regulated entities like insurance companies because of their safety, having a risk
weighting of 10 percent."'




AA, etc = 10%
risk weighting)
In the United Kingdom, because no legislation existed, a functional equiva-
lent was crafted through contract, which had to be credible to city investors in the
continuing absence of specific legislation. The lawyer, a securitization partner in
a large city law firm, was approached by one of the major investment banks, in
conjunction with a commercial bank, to structure a vehicle that would achieve
similar results to the Pfandbriefe. The bank wanted to issue bonds over a pool of
assets held by a bank, which would have a 20 percent risk weighting. The lawyer's
structure entailed a bank issuing bonds that were triple A rated by the credit rat-
ing agencies. Then a limited liability partnership (LLP), a tax transparent vehicle,
was created and from the proceeds of the bonds the bank made a loan to the LLP.
The LLP used the loan to pay the purchase price of a pool of mortgage loans and
then the LLP guaranteed the obligations of the bank under the bonds. This gave
the bondholders access to the assets of the LLP if the bank became insolvent. And
the bank ensured the pool of assets was topped up."6
115. See Figure I (based on drawings done by the lawyer during the interview).
116. See Figure 2 (derives from the same meeting as Figure 1).
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Figure 2: The Composition of a UK Covered Bond




The limited liability partnership was used in preference to a special purpose
vehicle to avoid the difficulties trust law imposed and to keep it within the bank,
since the deal was not done off-balance sheet.17 The bonds were also over-collateral-
ized by the assets being about 50 percent more than needed to cover the bonds. This
was a requirement of the credit rating agencies in order for them to give the bonds a
triple A rating. The bank, being one of the members of the LLP, then had a greater
share of equity because of the over-collateralization and received the excess back by
virtue of a capital distribution. As the lawyer pointed out, "It's quite tidy."
The first covered bond, worth E3 billion, was issued by HBOS in conjunc-
tion with Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein, Goldman Sachs, and Citigroup.
HBOS needed to fund its balance sheet-as opposed to going off-balance sheet
with many debt vehicles-so even though it used techniques of the securitization
process it was "'structured not be a credit product'.... The aim was to produce a
true swaps/government bond substitute.""' 8 It was long and expensive to prepare
because the "[riating agencies together required five legal opinions before giving
[it] their top ratings... 9 Figure 3 shows how the HBOS covered bond was struc-
117. If a special purpose vehicle were used, it and its assets would have had to have been remote
from the originating bank in order to protect it in the event of the bank's bankruptcy.
118. Monica Vetter & Alex Chambers, Thomson Financial, HBOS Opens the Structured Door,
INT'L Fi . REv., 2003, http://www.hbosplc.com/treasury/Covered%20Bond.pdf.
119. Id.
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tured1 21 Since the HBOS issue, at least four other financial institutions have fol-
lowed with their own covered bonds.





*includes Capital Contribution + Deferred Consideration
The U.K. covered bond created considerable controversy. Its key component
was that because it was created in conjunction with U.K. insolvency law, the U.K.
bond had greater protection than its German equivalent. This meant that the re-
turns to the U.K. bond were also greater, which pulled investors from the Pfand-
briefe market to the U.K. covered bond. Figure 4 shows how the U.K. covered
bond compares with others in Europe that are approved by legislation. Not only
does it target the residential mortgage market, it has high bankruptcy protection
and high credit ratings. The Pfandbriefe suffers in all elements by comparison
with the U.K. covered bond. 2'
120. See Figure 3. HBOS Treasury Services, UK Covered Bond Programme, Slide 5, http://www.
hbosplc.com/treasury/presentations/041018%20Cov%20Bond.pps (last visited Nov. 15, 2006).
121. See Figure 4. HBOS Treasury Services, UK Covered Bond Programme, Slide 10, http://
www.hbosplc.com/treasury/presentations/041018%2Cov%2OBond.pps (last visited Nov. 15,
2006).
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Figure 4: UK Covered Bond Comparisons
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The German mortgage banks presented their dislike of the U.K. covered
bond by arguing it was not in accord with the EU directive. The English banks
were uneasy because they wanted to reduce the risk weighting from 20 percent to
10 percent, which led them to lobby the Treasury and the FSA to legislate.1 22 Fi-
nally, after a period of three years, the Treasury has agreed to enact legislation.'
23
REFLECTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The following are a series of conjectures and ideas flowing from the case
study. Most are based on comments by lawyers who were interviewed during this
project.
1. Big law firms get work because they are big law firms and clients return. The
lawyer in the case study said:
It's chicken and egg. As a group, the group I've worked with has
always tried to do cutting edge deals. And once you've done one
people tend to trust you and come to you with a wacky idea. That's
one aspect.
122. See Creditmag.com, Credit Forum, Uncovering Covered Bonds (May 1, 2004), http://www.
creditmag.com/public/showPage.html ? page= 154079.
123. Christopher Adams & Paul J. Davies, Boost to Market for Covered Bonds Could Lead to
Cheaper Home Loans, FIN. TIMES (London), June 30, 2006, at 3.
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The thing about securitization in particular is that it's dominated
by four firms and people tend to go to one of those four. It's just
such a habit that it's not always the lawyers which are doing the
creative thinking. It's always in conjunction with an idea that we'll
work in partnership particularly with lead arrangers-Citigroup,
Goldman Sachs especially. And we work a lot with them in terms
of new ideas.'24
2. Despite the fact that law firms are more fluid entities than in the past with law-
yers migrating from firm to firm, clients will cleave to a particular firm rather than
always follow the lawyer. One lawyer interviewed noted:
I think that sometimes with clients it's a matter of trust. They'll go to
["Flood & Sosa"] law firm because they know they can do this. Because
sometimes it's not the person but actually the brand of the firm. They'll
say I know with ["Flood & Sosa"] I get the team not just the lawyer.'
Big firm lawyers also tend to work with business people. Even though their
clients-corporations, investment banks, property companies-have in house
counsel, it is the business side that calls the shots. And they often prefer to work
with lawyers directly rather than mediate through counsel.
The big law firms go hand in hand with the big investment banks that have
their European headquarters in London. Other European offices tend to deal
with local matters. One interesting element remarked on by a lawyer was:
Only a minority of people working at the big banks are English.
Most of the investment bankers come from anywhere. Lots of Ital-
ians, lots of Americans, lots of Germans, even some of Dutch peo-
ple. And they tend to be the best, the most qualified. Even if they
are not English, they will turn to English firms to run a deal be-
cause we have some of the biggest city offices in the world as well as
some of the biggest firms. And so that automatically means with
size comes depth. Depth of experience, having done things before,
and sophistication.'26
124. Interview with large law firm corporate lawyer, in London, Eng. (May 2005).
125. Interview with large law firm corporate lawyer, in London, Eng. (May 2005).
126. Interview with large law firm corporate lawyer, in London, Eng. (Apr. 2005).
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3. Anglo-American law is sovereign. Path dependency plays strongly here. A
lawyer pronounced, for example in connection with English law, that, "People
find certainty in English law and English law is a lot more creditor friendly than
the other continental jurisdictions. The contract is king. People tend to be a lot
more comfortable because the documents tend to be the deal; there's less that's left
unsaid but remaining in legislation." Another lawyer said, "Obviously you take
account of the peculiarities of national law, but the agreements look the same and
they will almost always be in the English language. Even in France where it's
technically illegal, but people pay their C300 fine for having their agreement in
English." A senior partner commented on one of his transactions that local law
could not be ignored:
We were handling a very large multinational acquisition involving
subsidiaries and so forth in a number of countries. The question
was how to draft documents that would bring all that together in a
uniform way. What I did was to have all the local variations drafted
under their own laws, then I constructed a master umbrella agree-
ment under English law that tied all of them together and yet rec-
ognized their differences. It was quite hard to do.'2'
This is analogous to Smets' idea of lawyers de-contextualizing idiomatic legal
wording and so constructing a disembedded core.'28 The process is imbricated in
a turf war between lawyers from different jurisdictions competing to impose their
claim controlling the process.'29
Yet another lawyer pointed out that the use of New York and English law
depended on whether the transaction was taking place in the western or eastern
hemisphere. The former used New York, the latter used English. But, ultimately,
the banks decide the issue. However, from the client's perspective it is different, as
this lawyer noted:
If a company has a relationship with a particular law firm or par-
ticular person or partner they tend to work with that person or that
type of form and most clients don't care about governing law. They
127. Interview with large law firm corporate lawyer, in London, Eng. (Sept. 1995).
128. Michael Smets, Aligning Local Expertise in Cross-National Legal Work: Translations in a
Global Law Firm's Banking Group (2006) (unpublished paper, on file with author).
129. Id.
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are concerned about commercial matters and the agreement is just
a reflection of what was the end of negotiation result. 3 '
4. Virtually all the work is performed through standard documentation, which is
then varied to suit the particular transaction. A law firm builds its social and intel-
lectual capital, as a lawyer put it, on the quality of its document library. Some
firms have been known to refuse to accept documents drafted by another firm
because they consider them of inferior quality. Not all transactions fit into typical
standard forms. One lawyer told of a deal that involved a securitization restruc-
turing a trust:
We'd never drafted a mortgages trust before so we started by going
down to the private client department that deals with trusts and
trustees all the time. You start with a simple document and change
it. There's lots of free drafting when you do something new. We rely
on the other side to review it, and the rating agencies. And if there
are real estate or tax issues my colleagues there will review it.'3'
There has to be agreement about who drafts the initial documents. It is cus-
tomary for the seller to provide the documents; if a transaction was a bi-lateral
sale and purchase, custom would dictate that the purchaser provide the docu-
ments. The key point here is that whoever originates the documentation has con-
siderable control over its life course and final composition. It is a position of
power.
5. Because of the way law firms are organized, choosing who works on a transac-
tion is never straightforward. In the case study, the lead partner used about nine
other lawyers in the transaction. As Lazega has demonstrated, a law firm is a
"Montesquieu structure,"' which entails interdependent niches negotiating the
deployment of resources within the firm. Two sets of negotiations are involved:
which associates and other partners within the immediate group will work on the
deal and which lawyers from other groups in the firm will be involved. Added to
this is the problem endemic to large law firms of how competent lawyers are iden-
tified and judged within a large firm. Networks seek to distribute information
130. Interview with large law firm corporate lawyer, in London, Eng. (Apr. 2005).
131. Interview with large law firm corporate lawyer, in London, Eng. (May 2005).
132. LAZEGA, supra note 39, at 39.
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that attests to the knowledge and reliability of others, but often the information is
dispersed. Finding a lawyer within a large law firm can be as difficult as finding
a law firm or lawyer in another country.
6. It is now possible to see how stability can be generated. The difficulty inherent
in the double contingency of action is overcome by providing congruently gener-
alized normative behavioral expectations.'33 Big law firms play a considerable role
in generating these expectations. Their lawyers and their standard documenta-
tion all regress to risk averse means. The very name of a firm signifies more than
the sum of its parts. For example, for a long time Japan forbade the use of firm
names by foreign law firms. The only names permitted were the names of the
partners present in Japan. Western law firms could not establish their identities.
Recent changes in Japanese laws on the legal profession and the influence of the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) have allowed foreign law firms
to use their "brand" names.'34 Branding has become a crucial element in deter-
mining and securing the value of a law firm. But it is not just the brand; it is also
the collective spirit of the law firm, it being a dynamic entity, that enables it to
confirm that transactions will be accepted as real, true, and valuable by the com-
mercial community at large. I return to my original claim that large law firm
lawyers are endowed with priestly attributes, that by conferring their imprimatur
on the transaction, the profane becomes sacred and believers have faith.
133. LUHMANN,SUpra note 100, at 26.
134. See Leonardo Ciano & Drew Martin,Japan's Foreign Lawyer Law: Disparate Views, 1 ALSB
INT'L Bus. L.J. 101 (2001), available at http://www.alsb.org/international/ijrnl/ciano-martin/text.
htm.
